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No Child Left Behind: Disincentives to Focus
Instruction on Students Above the Passing
Threshold
CHRISTINA PAYNE-TSOUPROS*
"An Act to close the achievement gap with accountability,flexibility,
and choice so that no child is left behind."'
If the achievement gap is closing, by what means is that happening? Is
the gap closingfrom the bottom up or top down?
I. INTRODUCTION
As a result of the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB), schools place a
great emphasis on standardized testing. Students at risk of failure are identified for additional instruction. This is aligned with the adequacy (versus
equity) framework of school finance litigation, which seeks to bring the
bottom up to a certain minimum level. Under the adequacy ideology, the
focus is on achieving a minimum threshold of proficiency. In low performing schools where a high percentage of students are at risk of failing
the test, a focus on the minimum creates disincentives to work with students performing at or above the testing expectations This is inappropriate because education functions in part as a positional good. We should not
adopt education policies that function as ceilings on students' achievement.
The existing body of education law literature on NCLB has a large
focus on low performing students, particularly in low performing
schools. Existing literature argues either that NCLB reforms education
for these students and school or it hurts them the most. There is little discussion about on level students who meet the testing expectations. These
students do not trigger the red flags that the low performing students do,
*J.D. 2010, William & Mary School of Law; M.Ed. 2006, University of Houston; BA.
2002, Cornell University. Thank you to my former colleagues at Judy Bush Elementary School
in Alief ISD in Houston, Texas, particularly Lorrie Dawleam, Arlene Francis, and Allana Tang,
who have touched the lives of countless children and helped many new teachers in the process.
Thank you also to Aris Tsoupros for patiently supporting everything I do.
1. No Child Left Behind Act, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002). The relevant sections for this Note are codified in 20 U.S.CA. §§ 6301-6316 (2006).
2. This Note refers to students performing at or above testing expectations as "on level," in
that they perform on grade level, meeting grade level expectations.
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and as a result, they may get lost in the mix. This would be more pronounced in low performing schools, where most of the students may be
at risk of failure. This Note argues that NCLB adversely affects students
performing at or above testing expectations. To remedy this, we should
use ideas from the equity framework of school finance litigation, which
is comparative in nature, to learn from the problems of NCLB as we
transition into Race to the Top and strive to maximize the potential of all
students, including the on level students.
School finance decisions since the 1960s have taken an equity or adequacy approach, or a combination of both approaches. The emphasis on
standards based reform has intersected with school finance decisions,
particularly since the enactment of NCLB. Existing literature analyzes
whether this will help or hinder plaintiffs in school finance lawsuits.
This Note intends to use the ideology of the equity and adequacy frameworks of school finance as lenses through which to view NCLB, particularly as it affects those students who meet the testing expectations in
low performing schools. NCLB is a parallel to the adequacy ideology,
setting goals at a minimum threshold of acceptability or proficiency.
Such goals are inappropriate as educational policy and this Note proposes ideas from the equity ideology as a means of coping with NCLB.
Part II provides background on the high stakes testing component of
NCLB and an overview of some of the main criticisms of the law. Part
III discusses the adequacy and equity frameworks of school finance litigation and how they intersect with NCLB. Part IV analyzes how using
adequacy as a lens or framework can help demonstrate how NCLB creates disincentives to work with students who are above the passing
mark. This analysis centers on low performing schools and argues that
NCLB creates incentives to work with students on the threshold of passing to the exclusion of the on level students, which results in a ceiling on
student achievement. Part V argues that focusing on a minimum level of
acceptability is poor public policy and suggests possible solutions, relying on aspects of the equity ideology, and addresses the potential drawbacks of an equity-oriented approach. Part VI concludes the Note with
specific examples of cases that have used equity-oriented approaches
that may serve as a model for future decisions.
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II. BACKGROUND ON NCLB AND HIGH-STAKES
TESTING

A. NCLB
NCLB is the reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act. President George W. Bush signed NCLB into law in
January 2002. 4 NCLB applies to any school that receives Title I funds,
which are federal funds provided to schools with a high percentage of
students from low income backgrounds.' Title I funds are intended to
supplement state educational funding and spending.' Under NCLB, the
states design the curriculum and the assessment, and the federal government holds the states accountable for how students perform on the
assessments .'
Under NCLB, states have to report test results publicly via an annual
report card Test results are disaggregated by state, district, and school,
into subgroups by gender, race, ethnicity, English proficiency, migrant
status, special education, and low socioeconomic status.9 By the 20132014 school year, each school district must have one hundred percent of
its students performing at the proficiency level designated by the state.10
The purpose of this target is for every child to learn, at a minimum, at
the level set by the state, and to hold schools accountable if that does not
happen."
To reach the one hundred percent proficiency goal, each year schools
are required to make "adequate yearly progress" (AYP), which is an
3. Trisha Loscalzo Yates, A Criticism of the No Child Left Behind Act: How the Convention
on the Rights of the Child Can Offer PromisingReform of Education Legislation in America, 5
W=rrrrtER J. CsmD. & FAM. ADvoc. 399, 401 (2006).
4. Id.
5. 20 U.S.CA. § 6314(a)(1) (2006). Schools in which forty percent of its students come
from low-income backgrounds qualify as Title I schools. See id. Low-income backgrounds are
determined by participation in free and reduced lunch programs as well as receiving assistance
through other programs including social security and Medicaid. 20 U.S.CA. § 6313(a)(5) (2006).
6. Daniel J. Losen, Challenging Racial Disparities:The Promises and Pitfalls of the No
Child Left BehindAct's Race-ConsciousAccountability, 47 How. L.J. 243,244-45 (2004).
7. Yates, supra note 3, at 402.
8. 20 U.S.C.A. § 6311(h)(1) (2006).
9. Id. § 6311(h)(1)(c)(i).
10. See id. § 6311(b)(2)(F).
11. E. JANE IRONS & SANDRA HARRis, THE CHALLENGES OF No CnuLD LEFT BEmm 21
(2007).
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annual benchmark set by the state requiring a certain percentage of the
school's subgroups to pass the exam. 2 Schools are required to test at
least ninety-five percent of all students within each subgroup.'3
The federal government imposes increasingly strict sanctions for failing to make AYP. If a school fails to meet AYP two years in a row, it is
identified for "school improvement.' ' The school must offer a school
choice option to parents of the enrolled students, which must be paid for
out of the school's Title I funds. 5 If a school fails to meet AYP a third
year, the school must offer supplemental education services, such as
tutoring or remedial classes, along with the option to transfer. 6 These
services are paid out of the school's Title I funds. 7 If the school fails to
meet AYP a fourth year, the school must implement corrective action in
addition to providing the above services, all of which are paid out of the
school's Title I funds8 If the school fails to meet AYP a fifth year, the
school will be restructured and turned over to the state or a private com19
pany.
B. Criticisms and Accolades of NCLB
Critics argue that NCLB creates numerous "perverse incentives" for
education." These include "teaching to the test"'" (which results in
sample corruption22 ), encouraging states to lower their academic stan12.20 U.S.C.A. § 6311(b)(2)(B) (2006).
13. Id. § 6311(b)(2)(I)(ii).
14. 20 U.S.C.A. § 6316(b)(1)(A) (2006).
15. Id. § 6316(b)(1)(E), (b)(10).
16. Id. § 6316(b)(5)(A)-(B); see also Yates, supra note 3, at 403.
17. Id. § 6316(b)(10).
18. Id. § 6316(b)(7)(C), (b)(10). Corrective action includes reassigning administrators,
teachers, and staff members as well as implementing different classroom curricula. Id. §
6316(b)(7)(A).
19. Id. § 6316(b)(8)(B).
20. See James E. Ryan, The PerverseIncentives of the No Child Left Behind Act, 79 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 932 (2004) [hereinafter Ryan, Perverse Incentives].
21. Gershon M. (Gary) Ratner, Why the No Child Left Behind Act Needs to be Restructured
to Accomplish its Goals and How to Do It, 9 UDC L. REv. 1, 16-17 (2007). Teaching to the test
is "teaching a scripted, narrowed and dumbed-down curriculum concentrated on memorization
of facts and lower-level thinking skills." Id.
22. Richard Rothstein, Holding Accountability to Account: How Scholarship and
Experience in Other Fields Inform Exploration of Performance Incentives in Education, 49
(Nat'l Center on Performance Incentives, Working Paper 2008-04, 2008). By focusing on only
those items expected to be tested, the potential validity of the test is corrupted as the test is valid
only to the extent that it is an accurate representation of the broader subject matter as well as typical of performance on other (non-testing days). Id.
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dards, 23 promoting school segregation,24 pushing out poor and minority students, 25 discouraging good teachers from taking jobs in challenging schools,26 and engaging in reclassification schemes to manipulate
the testing pool in order to maximize ratings.27 Most egregiously, there
23. See Ryan, Perverse Incentives, supra note 20, at 947-48; see also Michael Heise, The
2006 Winthrop and Frances Lane Lecture: The UnintendedLegal and Policy Consequences of
the No Child Left Behind Act, 86 NEn. L. REv. 119, 129 (2007)("At worst, it [NCLB] creates a
palpable incentive for states to dilute their academic standards and proficiency thresholds.").
Robert L. Linn, former president of the American Educational Research Association and professor at University of Colorado stated that severe sanctions "implicitly encourage states to water
down their content and performance standards." See Sam Dillon, States are Relaxing Education
Standards to Avoid Sanctions From Federal Law, N.Y. TiMEs, May 22, 2003, at A29. In 2003,
Texas lowered the correct number of questions needed to pass the third grade reading test from
twenty-four out of thirty-six (66.7 percent) to twenty out of thirty-six (55.6 percent). Id. Since the
passage of NCLB, Michigan has lowered the percentage of students who must pass the state test
to meet the school's AYP in high school English from seventy-five percent to forty-two percent.
Id. Colorado changed its grading system so that students who were previously labeled "partially
proficient" became included in the "proficient" category. Id.
24. See Ryan, Perverse Incentives, supra note 20, at 961-66.
25. Id. at 969-70. For example, Tamar Lewin and Jennifer Medina maintain that New York City
pushed out students not likely to pass the test and (mis)classified these students under various bureaucratic categories. Tamar Lewin & Jennifer Medina, To Cut FailureRate, Schools Shed Students, N.Y.
TtMs, July 31,2003, at Al. Moreover, students may also be retained before a key testing grade so
their scores will not count against the school. See Ratner, supra note 21, at 15; see also George
Madaus & Marguerite Clarke, The Adverse Impact of High-Stakes Testing on Minority Students:
Evidencefrom One Hundred Years of Test Data, in RAsING STANDARDS OR RAiING BARRiERs? 85,
101 (Gary Orfield & Mindy L. Komhaber eds., 2001) (noting that schools "red shirt[]" kindergarten
students so they have an extra year to develop skills needed for testing in later grades).
26. See Ryan, Perverse Incentives, supra note 20, at 971-76.
27. See Ratner, supra note 21, at 14-15. Ratner states that a high stakes testing requirement is
"an invitation to manipulation." Id. at 15. Julie Berry Cullen and Randall Reback note that, largely
due to the ninety-five percent participation requirement of NCLB, with respect to manipulating the
testing pool, NCLB is an improvement from previous systems. Julie Berry Cullen & Randall
Reback, Tinkering Toward Accolades: School Gaming Under a PerformanceAccountability System
30 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12286, 2006). However, risk of testing
pool manipulation still exist: Special education students, for example, may be eligible for testing
accommodations such as additional time or certain test items read aloud. David N. Figlio &
Lawrence S. Getzler, Accountability, Ability and Disability: Gaming the System 13 (Nat'l Bureau
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9307, 2002). Incentives may thus still exist to classify students as special education to take advantage of these accommodations. Id. at 13-14. Further, even
under NCLB, entire groups of students may be excluded from the testing reports. Under NCLB, if
a group is too small to be statistically significant, the school does not need to disaggregate the performance of the students in that group. 20 U.S.C.A. § 6311 (b)(2)(C)(v)(II)(dd) (2006). States decide
at what point a group is too small to produce meaningful data. See id. This provision has led to the
exclusion of minority students' test scores. See Frank Bass, et. al., Left Behind, SUN HERALD, Apr.
18, 2006, at Cl. As a result of this provision, the test scores of 65,000 Asian students in Texas were
not reported by subgroup. Id. ("Minorities are seven times as likely to have their scores excluded as
whites."). There is also evidence that schools use disciplinary action against students strategically
in order to improve aggregate school performance. See David N. Figlio, Testing, Crime and
Punishment 2-5 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11194, 2005) (finding that
after the implementation of NCLB, schools in Florida gave more severe punishments to lower performing students in testing grades than higher performing students for similar infractions, and this
phenomenon was particularly pronounced during the testing period).
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have been instances of teachers and principals cheating on the test
itself, as a result of the high pressures of NCLB.28
Other criticisms of NCLB include that labeling schools as failing 9
may have an adverse effect on the community in that public school quality has an impact on housing prices 0° Other charges include that the
"highly qualified" teacher label itself is flawed3 ' and that NCLB is
underfunded, leading to a reduction or cancellation of programs and subjects that are not tested. 2
Critics of NCLB also note that each state determining its own curriculum and assessment results in different standards across states. When comparing student performance on the state test to student performance on the
National Association of Educational Progress (NAEP) assessment, discrepancies between states emerge 3 The NAEP is the only test administered nationwide, and therefore it can serve as a basis for comparing
assessments between states .3 Comparing NAEP and state test data demonstrates that it may be easier to achieve proficiency in one state than another. For example, on the 2007 NAEP, twenty-five percent of fourth grade
5
students in South Carolina achieved proficiency or above in reading?
Twenty-nine percent of fourth-graders in North Carolina achieved profi-

28. See Ratner, supra note 21, at 15. Methods of cheating include changing students'
answers on the exam, handing out the exam or the exam and answers prior to the test, and tutoring students with the test itself. Id. The high pressure of NCLB is not a sufficient excuse for such
misconduct, however this is yet another example of a "perverse incentive," Ryan, Perverse
Incentives, supra note 20, created by a high stakes testing regime.
29. Schools failing to make AYP are not technically labeled as "failing;" they are identified as
in need of "school improvement." See supra notes 14-19 and accompanying text. However, the failing label is often popularly attached to these schools. See Ryan, PerverseIncentives, supra note 20,
at 955; see also Michael Heise, Litigated Learning, Law's Limits, and Urban School Reform
Challenges, 85 N.C. L. REv. 1419, 1436 (2007) [hereinafter Heise, Litigated Learning]("Any
school required to make such an admission [that parents may send their children to another public
school] will undoubtedly convey-whether it wants to or not-the impression that it is failing.").
30. See Donald R. Haurin & David Brasington, School Quality and Real House Prices:
Inter- and Intrametropolitan Effects, 5 J. HouSING ECON. 351, 363 (1996); see also Ryan,
Perverse Incentives, supra note 20, at 950-52 (explaining that evidence indicates the "perceived
quality of public schools" affects homeowners' and business's decisions of where to locate.)
31. See Ryan, PerverseIncentives, supranote 20, at 976-78; Yates, supra note 3, at 417-19.
32. See Yates, supra note 3, at 408-22.
33. See Paul E. Peterson & Frederick M. Hess, Keeping an Eye on State Standards:A Race
to the Bottom?, EDUCATION NEXr, Summer 2006, at 28.
34. National Center for Education Statistics, Overview, http://nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/
about (last visited Nov. 16,2008).
35. National Center for Education Statistics, South Carolina Reading 2007 State Snapshot
Report, http://nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/pdf/stt2007/2007497SC4.pdf (last visited Nov. 22,
2008).
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ciency or above on the same test in 2007.36 On the state tests to determine
proficiency under NCLB, while only fifty-three percent of South Carolina
fourth graders achieved proficiency in reading 37 eighty-five percent of
North Carolina students did.3 Such a discrepancy appears contrary to the
federal purpose of NCLB, which seeks to hold states accountable for
bringing all students up to a level of proficiency if proficiency means different things in different states .
Further potentially contributing to discrepancies, states set their goals
to reach one hundred percent proficiency by the 2013-2014 school year
differently.' Some states set slow rates of improvement for the first few
years and then have to drastically improve to meet AYP.4 For example,
during the 2007-2008 school year, a prominent California elementary
school was unable to meet4 2AYP because the rate of improvement needed increased dramatically.
More broadly, critics argue a fundamental flaw of NCLB is its remedial approach.43 NCLB, these critics argue, simply dictates the required
end (achieve one hundred percent proficiency) without providing need-

36. National Center for Education Statistics, North Carolina Reading 2007 State Snapshot
Report, http://nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/pdf/stt2007/2007497NC4.pdf (last visited Nov. 22,
2008).
37. U.S. Dep't of Educ., Mapping South Carolina's Educational Progress, www.ed.gov/
nclb/accountability/results/progress/sc.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2008).
38. U.S. Dep't of Educ., Mapping North Carolina's Educational Progress, www.ed.gov/
nclb/accountability/results/progress/nc.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2008). This leads to the illogical
conclusion that "Suzy could be a good reader in North Carolina... but a failure in neighboring South
Carolina..." because of the discrepancy in standards. Peterson & Hess, supra note 33, at 28.
39. Peterson and Hess compared student performance on state math and reading tests in
2003 and 2005 to those students' performance on the NAEP and assigned states a letter grade (A
through F) based on how clearly the results matched. Id. at 28-29. In 2005, Peterson and Hess
scored South Carolina as an "A" in (fourth- and eighth-grade) reading and North Carolina as an
"F" in (fourth- and eighth-grade) reading. Id. at 29.
40. Sam Dillon, Under 'No Child' Law, Even Solid Schools Falter, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13,
2008, at Al.
41. Id. (State officials in California "require[d] only minimal gains in the first years after the
law was passed and then very rapid annual gains later.") It is possible states expected the law to
have been adjusted by now. Id. But NCLB was reauthorized in 2007 and this component has not
changed. Id.
42. Id. Richard Cardullo, professor at the University of California, Riverside, likened this
approach to meeting one-hundred percent proficiency to "a balloon payment [mortgage] scenario ... where the expectations set forth in the federal law are far higher than recent performance levels." Id. Cardullo suggested that by 2014 almost every California elementary school
will fall below expectations. Id. Ratner goes so far to say that by 2014 almost all schools in all
states will fail to meet AYP. Ratner, supra note 21, at 34 (quoting Diana Jean Schemo, Effort by
Bush on EducationHits Obstacles, N.Y. TiMEs, Aug. 18, 2004, at Al).
43. Ratner, supra note 21, at 2.
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ed assistance on how to achieve that end.' Schools require assistance
with the specific structural changes needed to achieve one hundred percent proficiency. 4 At present, Gary Ratner argues, schools do not know
how to achieve the goal of one-hundred percent proficiency, do not have
the capacity to do so, and the imposition of the harsh sanctions of NCLB
will not make the needed improvements appear. 6
Interestingly, while much of the criticism of NCLB is politicized, criticism comes from both the political left and the political right.47 Much of
the criticism comes from the political left, which argues against the dominance of standardized tests.' Some of the political right argues against
the intrusion of the federal government into state control of education 9
Supporters of NCLB contend that the law has been transformative for
addressing the chronic underachievement of poor and minority students.' Standards based reform, these authors argue, is a critical step in
reforming education. 1 Using diagnostic data, teachers and administrators can improve student learning, particularly so if what happens in
other states serves as an incentive or "goad to improvement. 52
44. Id. at 17-18.
45. Id. at 22-23, 28-29.
46. Id. at 49. Joshua Williams states there is a "war on education," likening NCLB to the
War on Drugs, arguing that a tough love approach of increasing sanctions without doing enough
to address the underlying problems is bad public policy. Joshua Williams, Note, The "War on
Education": The Negative Impact of the No ChildLeft BehindAct on Inner-CityPublic Schools,
Students, and Teachers, 11 J. GENDER, RAcE & JUST. 573 (2008).
47. See James E. Ryan, Standards, Testing, and School Finance Litigation, 86 TEx. L. REv.
1223, 1228 (2008) [hereinafter Ryan, Standards]. NCLB was passed with overwhelming bipartisan support. See Ryan, Perverse Incentives, supra note 20, at 937; Yates, supra note 3, at 399.
Some suggest the terrorist attacks of September 11,2001 played a role in the passage of this law.
See, e.g., Coulter M. Bump, Comment, Reviving the Coercion Test: A Proposal to Prevent
FederalConditionalSpending that Leaves ChildrenBehind, 76 UNv. CoLo. L. REV.521,521-22
(2005) (noting the expediency with which the law was passed was "in efforts to unite our country after the threat of insecurity" of September 11).
48. Ryan, Standards,supra note 47, at 1228.
49. Id. For example, Utah formally defied NCLB. The state legislature passed a bill allowing
Utah schools to ignore NCLB if the federal requirements conflicted with state goals or required
state funds. Amanda Ripley et. al., Inside the Revolt Over Bush's School Rules: The Reddest ofAll
States in Leading the Charge Against No Child Left Behind, TIME MAG., May 2, 2005, at 30. In
addition to states' rights concerns, supporters of the bill also resented the public accounting aspect
of NCLB, claiming it "shamed" schools and communities not meeting AYP. Id.
50. See, e.g., James S. Liebman & Charles F. Sabel, The FederalNo Child Left Behind Act
and the Post-DesegregationCivil Rights Agenda, 81 N.C. L. REv. 1703 (2003) (arguing NCLB
can provide tools for civil rights litigation); Losen, supra note 6 (arguing NCLB is a means to
pursue racial equality and justice).
51. Liebman & Sabel, supra note 50, at 1735-36.
52. Id. at 1736. Liebman and Sabel contend that NCLB promotes "a mutually reinforcing
race to the top nationwide both in statewide school governance and in district, school, and classroom reform." Id.
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NLCB, supporters argue, offers political and legal means for addressing flaws in public education. 3 Disaggregating the testing data reveals
disparities across racial (and other) subgroups.' These disparities may be
hidden in the aggregate data, but disaggregation reveals any subgroup
failing to reach AYP and is sufficient to trigger intervention or sanctions '
Supporters contend that such public reporting raises awareness of discrepancies in educational performance across different racial groups.'
There are many arguments supporting and contesting NCLB. Despite
these conflicting arguments, at this point, it appears that it is too early to
draw definite conclusions about the long-term effects of NCLB.7' Some
evidence indicates that despite its shortcomings, NCLB has improved
public education. Richard Rothstein found that performance incentive
plans in fields other than education "improve average performance."'
Derek Neal and Diane Whitmore Schanzenbach found that although
"many students do benefit academically from NCLB," other students
were either not helped or harmed by it. 9 However, the "perverse incentives"' previously discussed ought to leave us wary of any proclamations of long-term success of NCLB at this stage.
Certain aspects of NCLB do warrant praise, even from critics. For
example, Ratner cites the "[i]ncreasingly strong national interest in education," "[h]olding states accountable for high standards of 'academic
[d]isaggregating assessment results," and "[p]ublicly
proficiency,'....
53. Id. at 1743-48.
54. Losen, supra note 6, at 260-65.
55. Id. at 263-64; see 20 U.S.C A. § 631 l(b)(2)(I)(i) (2006).
56. See Liebman & Sabel, supra note 50, at 1707.
57. See William S. Koski & Rob Reich, When "Adequate" Isn't: The Retreat from Equity in
Educational Law and Policy and Why It Matters, 56 EMORY L.J. 5459 581 (2006) (noting that any
positive results reported may be the result of teaching test-taking skills in testing subjects, rather
than actual improved learning); accord. Madaus & Clarke, supra note 25, at 85-86. (Others suggest that much of the NCLB discussion is too ideological and rhetorical and lacks sufficient data
about the law and its effects. See No CmD LEFr BEHIND AND THE REDUCTON OF THE
AcHiEvEmENT GAP xi-xii (Alan R. Sadovnik et. al. eds., 2008).
58. Rothstein, supra note 22, at 78. Rothstein compared a performance incentive system in
education to one in health care, quoting Steven Kelman and John N. Friedman, "[I]t is better to
manage an organization using imperfect measures than using none at all." Id. (quoting Steven
Kelman & John N. Friedman, Performance Improvement and Performance Dysfunction: An
Empirical Examination of Impacts of the Emergency Room Wait-lime Target in the English
National Health Service (Kennedy School of Government Faculty Research, Working Paper No.
RWP07-034, 2007)).
59. Derek Neal & Diane Whitmore Schanzenbach, Left Behind by Design: Proficiency
Counts and Test-Based Accountability 9 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
13293, 2007).
60. Ryan, Perverse Incentives, supra note 20.
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reporting disaggregated assessment results" as contributions of NCLB to
public education." Although positive aspects of NCLB may exist, the
incentives are aligned in such a way that merit re-examination to better
our educational policy. This Note proposes that it is important for policy makers and advocates to remain mindful of these incentives as we
transition into the era of Race to the Top under the Obama administration.
III. ADEQUACY AND EQUITY FRAMEWORKS OF
SCHOOL FINANCE LITIGATION INTERSECTING WITH
NCLB
School finance litigation results from disparities in the property
wealth of school districts within a state. 2 The rationale of court decisions in school finance cases can be considered as having an "adequacy"
basis or an "equity" basis.63 Adequacy decisions focus on bringing all
students up to a designated level of quality.' Peter Enrich, in a seminal
piece on adequacy and equity in school finance litigation, refers to the
adequacy decisions as the "foundation funding" approach in which the
court seeks to bring "all districts up to an acceptable minimum service
level."65 Adequacy decisions seek to address the "substantive quality" of
educational opportunities .'
Equity decisions, by contrast, are comparative, and seek equal treatment. 7 Enrich refers to equity as a "power equalization" approach by
61. Ratner, supra note 21, at 30-32.
62. Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School Finance Reform, 48
VAND. L. REv. 101, 105-06 (1995).
63. Koski & Reich, supra note 57, at 556-61.
64. James E. Ryan & Thomas Saunders, Foreward to Symposium on School Finance
Litigation: Emerging Trends or New Dead Ends?, 22 YALE. L. & POL'Y REv. 463, 467 (2004).
65. Enrich, supra note 62, at 112. Under a foundation funding, or adequacy, approach, states
determine the minimum funding level for an acceptable level of education and supply funds to
help a district reach that level. Id. Koski and Reich detail the possible approaches under an adequacy remedial scheme. These include a court delineating a standard threshold proficiency level,
a cost out approach in which the cost of an adequate education is determined by reference to a
model school, directing specific types of educational programs, and simply ordering a state to
conform to a specified outcome. Koski & Reich, supra note 57, at 565.
66. Enrich, supra note 62, at 140.
67. Koski & Reich, supra note 57, at 589. Examples of seeking equal treatment include
seeking equal funding or equal capacity for fund raising. See Ryan & Saunders, supra note 64, at
466.
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which states provide poorer districts with additional funds to bring them
up to the level of wealthier districts .'
Much of the literature views a trajectory from equity to adequacy in
school finance litigation decisions from the late 1960s to the present.69
The idea of equity, stemming from the Brown v. Board of Education
decision,7 ° fueled the first "wave" of school finance litigation decisions
in the 1960s. 7 Plaintiffs brought suit under the federal equal protection
clause, claiming that funding per pupil needed to be equal and independent of the wealth of the school district.72 This wave ended with San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, where the Supreme
Court held that San Antonio's school financing system, which was based
on local property taxes, did not violate the federal equal protection
clause.73 Following Rodriguez, scholars mark the second wave of school
finance litigation from 1973 to 1989, where plaintiffs sued under state
equality provisions or the state education article.74 In both the first and
second waves, plaintiffs were largely unsuccessful overall."' The third
68. Enrich, supra note 62, at 111. The additional funds are provided under this conception
on the rationale that had the district been wealthier, the property tax base would have provided
the additional funds. Id.
69. See, e.g., Christopher E. Adams, Is Economic Integration the Fourth Wave in School
Finance Litigation?, 56 EMORY L.J. 1613 (2007) (describing the wave theory and the shift from
equity to adequacy); Enrich, supra note 62 (one of the earliest articles noting this shift); Michael
Heise, The Courts, EducationalPolicy and UnintendedConsequences, 11 CoRNEL. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 633, 647-49 (2002) [hereinafter Heise, Unintended Consequences];William S. Koski, Of
Fuzzy StandardsandInstitutional Constraints:A Re-Examining of the JurisprudentialHistory of
Educational FinanceReform Litigation, 43 SANrA CLARA L. REv. 1185 (2003); Koski & Reich,
supra note 57, at 555 (noting the shift from "a right which must be made available to all on equal
terms," Brown v. Bd. of Ed., 347 U.S. 483,493 (1954), to "a sound basic education," Vincent v.
Voight, 614 N.W.2d 388,396 (Wis. 2000)).
70. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
71. See Adams, supra note 69, at 1619.
72. See Adams, supra note 69, at 1619. The decision in Serrano v. Priest I, in which
California's funding system was declared unconstitutional on both state and federal equal protection grounds, supported this conception. 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971).
73. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). "[T]he United States Supreme Court in San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez slammed the door on fiscal equity claims under the Equal Protection
Clause and thereby terminated school finance reform litigation in the federal courts." Koski,
supra note 69, at 1188.
74. Koski, supra note 69, at 1189-92. In many state constitutions, the education article puts
an express duty on state governments to provide for public education. Id. at 1189.
75. Id. at 1188-89. Of the twenty-two significant state court decisions of the second wave of
school finance, plaintiffs succeeded in seven. Id. at 1189. Plaintiffs experienced success in lower
federal courts in eight states (and the California Supreme Court) prior to San Antonio v.
Rodriguez, but that decision foreclosed plaintiff's opportunities in federal court. Ryan &
Saunders, supra note 64, at 466. Koski suggests courts were unwilling to interfere, in general, in
the first two waves. Koski, supra note 69, at 1189.

482

Journal of Law & Education

[Vol. 39, No. 4

wave of school finance litigation is marked by the Kentucky case, Rose
v. Councilfor Better Education,76 in which the Kentucky Supreme Court
held the state must provide students an adequate education.' The decision in Rose started the interaction of school finance litigation and standards.78 As a result of the shift to adequacy, courts can now use existing
state standards to define an adequate education.79
Despite the prevailing conception of waves to describe school finance
litigation, there is substantial and growing scholarship that departs from
this approach, arguing that the line between adequacy and equity in the
court decisions has not actually been clear cut.8" James Ryan argues that
adequacy and equity are actually "flip sides of the same coin," because,
even in adequacy cases, courts focus on whether resources have been
comparable among schools. 8' Because of this, some argue that adequacy
and equity labels are inappropriate.8
Importantly, Ryan notes a tension between school finance litigation
and standardsY Standards set a baseline, and, according to Ryan, are
fundamentally noncomparative whereas school finance litigation is

76. 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989).
77. See Koski & Reich, supra note 57, at 559.
78. See Heise, Unintended Consequences, supra note 69, at 634; Benjamin Michael
Superfine, Using the Courts to Influence the Implementation of No Child Left Behind, 28
CARDozo L. REv. 779, 827 (2006).
79. Superfine, supra note 78, at 828. Courts can use data from the standards based assessment to determine whether the state is providing an adequate education, in which case state standards become the definition of an adequate education. Id.
80. See, e.g., Koski, supra note 69, at 1194; Ryan, Standards, supra note 47, at 1225.
81. Ryan, Standards, supra note 47, at 1251. Ryan argues that courts have focused on the
disparities in funding, curriculum, extracurricular activities, and teacher quality throughout the
waves, including in Rose v. Councilfor Better Education. Id. at 1232-36. Ryan argues that courts
seek to ensure comparability, rather than pure equity or pure adequacy. Id. at 1238. Cases that
may be illustrative of Ryan's argument include Helena Elementary School DistrictNo.1 v. State,
769 P.2d 684, 690 (Mont. 1989), in which the court held that fiscal disparities between school
districts does not "justify perpetuating inequities" in per pupil spending across districts, and
Edgewood Independent School Districtv. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 397 (Tex. 1989), in which the
court held that disparate economic development across the state was not sufficient to justify discrepancies in expenditures per pupil ranging from $2112 to $19,333.
82. E.g., Richard Briffault, Adding Adequacy to Equity, in SCHOOL MONEY TRIALS 25, 26
(Martin R. West & Paul E. Peterson eds., 2007) (arguing that the wave theory "has been sharply
overstated, temporally, textually, in terms of litigation success, and as a matter of legal theory");
Koski, supra note 69, at 1194 (stating that courts use the labels of adequacy and equity for flexibility and authority, recognizing institutional capacities); Ryan, Standards, supra note 47, at
1251-52 (suggesting replacing labels of adequacy and equity with "comparability"). According
to Koski, a court is more likely to use an adequacy approach if it seeks to intervene. Koski, supra
note 69, at 1191-92.
83. See Ryan, Standards,supra note 47, at 1239-43.
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comparative. ' This argument appears to have substantial merit, however, whether this is in fact true is not critical at present. 5 The thrust of this
Note is that we can use the adequacy and equity frameworks as a lens to
view NCLB and we should look to the fundamentals of an equity framework to approach subsequent educational reforms.
IV. VIEWED THROUGH THE LENS OF ADEQUACY,
NCLB CREATES DISINCENTIVES TO WORK WITH ON
LEVEL STUDENTS.
"We were told to cross off the kids who would never pass... We were
told to cross off the kids who, if we handed them the test tomorrow, they
would pass. And the kids who were left over, those were the kids we
were supposed to focus on."86
A. Why Focus on Low Performing Schools
In a low performing school, nearly all of the students may be at risk
of failing the state assessment.' The potential problems of NCLB may
be particularly acute for at-risk studentsY Title I schools need federal
funds to function, but these are the schools most severely punished by
NCLB as they get deeper and deeper into sanctions.89 The pressures on

84. Id. at 1238.
85. If Ryan is correct, we can look to existing case law for ideas. See discussion of Hoke v.
State and Abbott v. Burke infra Part VI.
86. Daniel de Vise, A ConcentratedApproach to Exams; Rockville School's Efforts Raise
Questions of Test-Prep Ethics, WASH. Posr, Mar. 4, 2007, at Cl (quoting a teacher at Earle B.
Wood Middle School in Rockville, Maryland).
87. See Ryan S. Vincent, No Child Left Behind, Only the Arts and Humanities: Emerging
Inequalitiesin Education Fifty Years After Brown, 44 WASHBURN LJ. 127,137-38 (2004) ("[A]n
examination of America's poorest schools uncovers a mostly urban, minority, and disadvantaged
educational landscape brimming with at-risk students."). The label "at risk" is a term used to
describe students performing below grade level, who are thus "at risk" of failing the state assessment. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 6314(b)(1)(B)(iii) (2006). In addition, "at risk" is often used to describe
children from poverty, children with special needs, children from non-English speaking homesessentially it is a catch-all term to identify students who have certain factors which may indicate
a potential for difficulty meeting grade level expectations. See, e.g., L. Darnell Weeden, Back to
the Future: Should Grutters Diversity Rationale Apply to Faculty Hiring? Is 7itle VII
Implicated?, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 511,524 (2005).
88. See, e.g., Neal & Schanzenbach, supra note 59 (implementing NCLB in Chicago hurt
the most struggling students).
89. See Yates, supra note 3, at 414.
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Title I schools and the people in them can be enormous.' The racial
achievement gap, by which white students disproportionately outperform minority students is of note as well.9' Low performing schools are
frequently disproportionately minority. 2
The criticisms of NCLB tend to be more pronounced in low performing schools.93 Low performing schools bear additional burdens as well.
For example, programs that broaden and motivate students, such as art
and music may be eliminated and "teaching to the test" is more pronounced.' There may be a stigma on teachers for "wasting" time on the
higher performing students who are likely to pass the test.95 These factors can lead to a change in the school culture and how teachers and students interact together. 96
Students in low performing schools may suffer dignitary harms,
according to William Koski and Rob Reich.' Dignitary harms result
from "implicitly communicated but glaringly obvious" insulting messages received by students in extremely deprived schools.' For example,
Jonathan Kozol visited high school students in predominantly minority
Camden, New Jersey, and found the students poignantly aware of the
differences in their school from schools in nearby affluent, suburban,
predominantly white Cherry Hill .' The message such disparities send to

90. Id. at 415.
91. See Losen, supra note 6, at 250-58.
92. See Vincent, supra note 87, at 137-38 ("[Mlost high poverty schools ... are primarily
minority schools in overwhelmingly minority districts").
93. See discussion supra Part II.B. Figlio and Getzler found that the behavior of manipulating the testing pool for the Florida state assessment was concentrated among lower performing
schools. Figlio & Getzler, supra note 27, at 3.
94. Katie Weitz White & James E. Rosenbaum, Inside the Black Box of Accountability, in
No CILD LEFT BnmND AND THE REDUCTION OF THE ACHIEVEMENT GAP 105-07 (Alan R. Sadovnik
et. al. eds., 2008).
95. Id. at 110.

96. See id. White and Rosenbaum describe how high stakes accountability can lead to a
"businesslike" model approach in that students significantly below the passing threshold may be
seen as "poor investments that probably won't help the school's bottom line." Id.; see also text
accompanying notes 127-28.
97. Koski & Reich, supra note 57, at 606.
98. Id.
99. JONATHAN KOZOL, SAVAGE INEQUALrIES 152 (1991). One student stated, "[Cherry Hill
students] have that money goin' to their schools. They have a nice clean school to go to. They
have carpets on the floors and air-conditioned rooms and brand-new books. Their old books,
when they're done with them, they ship them here to us." Id.
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students in Camden is that they do not deserve the superior resources
and facilities."
Interestingly, Koski and Reich note that although these dignitary
harms occur most frequently in schools suffering the greatest deprivation, dignitary harms may still exist "for students well above an adequate
threshold."''
The focus on standardized testing in low performing schools has negative consequences, including goal distortion and "educational triage."0 2
When the test carries such high stakes, there is the risk of the test becoming the end in itself, instead of a measure or indicator.' Passing the test
becomes the definition of quality teaching and learning." 4 Thus, the state
has incentives to lower the standards to make the test easier to pass.'
Educational triage, or targeting some students at the expense of others, is another negative consequence that may occur in low performing
schools as a result of the high stakes testing of NCLB .06 NCLB shifts the
focus from meeting the needs of individual students to increasing passing rates."I NCLB does not reward schools for improving student performance unless improvements bring the students up to a specific designated passing mark.' 8 NCLB does not reward or punish changes unless
those changes increase or decrease the number of proficient students ."0
As a result, the incentive is for teachers to work with students just below
the proficiency threshold."0 There is no incentive for teachers to work

100. See Koski & Reich, supra note 57, at 606 ("[Ulnequal schooling can create stigma,
insult an individual's self-worth, and undermine the social bases of self-respect.").
101. Id.
102. Jennifer Booher-Jennings, Rationing Educationin an Era ofAccountability, Pm DELTA
KAPPAN, June 2006, at 758 [hereinafter Booher-Jennings, Rationing Education]. Booher-Jennings
credits the phrase "educational triage" to David Gillborn and Deborah Youdell in RATIONiNG
EDUCATION: PoLIcY,PRACricE, REFORM,AND EQUrrY. Id. at 761 n.1.
103. See Rothstein, supra note 22, at 11.
104. White & Rosenbaum, supra note 94, at 109.
105. See Ryan, Standards,supra note 47, at 1248. The state has incentives to lower both the
legislative standards and the standards on the tests used to assess proficiency. Id. For example,
since the enactment of NCLB, Tennessee has reduced the number of questions that students needed to answer correctly to pass the eighth grade reading test. Id. In 2003, students needed to
answer 36 out of 70 (51.4 percent) questions correctly. Id. In 2004, students needed to answer 29
out of 68 (42.6 percent) questions correctly. Id. In 2005, students needed to answer 22 out of 55
(40 percent) questions correctly. Id.; see discussion of lowering standards supra Part II.B.
106. Jennifer Booher-Jennings, Rationing Education, supra note 102, at 758.
107. Id. at 759.
108. Neal & Schanzenbach, supra note 59, at 4.
109. Id.
110. Rothstein, supra note 22, at 24.
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with those students above the proficiency point or those students far
below it."'
In a study of an urban elementary school in Brickland, Texas, Jennifer
Booher-Jennings found that teachers focused their instruction on students at the threshold of passing the state assessment."2 The studied
school was comprised of economically disadvantaged minority students." 3 Booher-Jennings found that the school offered targeted services
toward students on the verge of passing the test,"'4 including additional
help in class (individually or in small groups), class time with a specialized literacy teacher, after-school and Saturday tutoring, summer school
programs, and utilizing music, physical education, and library teachers
for tutoring instead of their assigned subjects." 5 These additional
resources were provided at expense to the other students, both those significantly below the passing mark and those above it."6
111. Id. This is not to say that teachers lack intrinsic motivation to work with other students.
The point is that NCLB creates an incentive system to work with some students at the expense
of others.
112. Jennifer Booher-Jennings, Below the Bubble: "Educational Triage" and the Texas
Accountability System, 42 AM. EDUC. RES. J. No. 2, 231 (2005) [hereinafter Booher-Jennings,
Below the Bubble].
113. Over ninety percent of the students qualified for free or reduced lunch. Id. at 236. The
number of students qualifying for free and reduced lunch is the marker used to indicate low
income status for Title I purposes. See supra note 5. Almost all students in the school were
Hispanic. Booher-Jennings, Below the Bubble, supra note 112, at 236.
114. Booher-Jennings (as well as others in the educational literature) refer to the students on
the threshold of proficiency as "bubble kids" in that the school's focus is on the area (bubble)
where gains and losses will help the school overall. See id. at 240; see also Rothstein, supra note
22, at 24 (explaining that "bubble" language has similar application in basketball and poker language to describe a cut-off line of particular significance).
115. Booher-Jennings, Below the Bubble, supra note 112, at 241-42.
116. Students significantly below the passing mark and those above it were assigned independent seatwork they could complete without instruction. Id. at 245. In some classrooms, college
students were hired to monitor these students while their teachers actively worked with the students on the verge of passing. Id. Randall Reback gives another example of finding educational
triage in Texas. Randall Reback, Teaching to the Rating: School Accountability and the
Distributionof Student Achievement (Barnard Coll. Dep't Econ., Working Paper No. 0602, 2007),
available at http://www.econ.bamard.columbia.edu/working-papers/wp0602.pdf. Reback used
data from 1992-1993 through 1997-1998 school years from across the state and found that students
performed better than expected when their test scores were particularly important for the school's
accountability ratings. Id. at 31. Relatively high achieving students performed worse than expected, leading Reback to conclude that school "sacrifice[d] relatively high achieving students' performance." Id. at 32. This was under the Texas Assessment of Academic Skills ("TAAS") testing
system, which was replaced by the Texas Assessment of Knowledge and Skills ("TAKS") under
NCLB. Id. at 33. However, TAAS, like the assessments under NCLB, is a minimum proficiency
test. Id. The primary difference between the two assessment systems is the ninety-five percent participation requirement under NCLB. See Cullen & Reback, supra note 27, at 30. In fact, TAAS
served as the template for NCLB. See Jennifer Booher-Jennings & Andrew A. Beveridge, Who
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Similarly, in a study of Chicago public schools, Katie Weitz White and
James E. Rosenbaum found that resources were focused on students who
were at the passing threshold."7 Educational triage may be even more
serious in the school that formed the basis of this study, as the higher
achieving students were actually just barely proficient when compared
to peers nationwide."' In a broader study of Chicago's public schools,
Neal and Schanzenbach compared test scores following the implementation of NCLB in 2002 and a similar local test implemented in 1996 and
found that although scores of students in the middle of the achievement
distribution increased in reading and math, the scores of the most severely struggling students did not." 9 Echoing the findings of BooherJennings, Neal and Schanzenbach concluded that high stakes testing systems such as NCLB create little incentives to direct attention on students
significantly below the passing mark or those already above it.'2°
Educational triage is accomplished by broad changes in resources and
instruction, and their allocation, as well as narrowly tailored attempts to
improve the performance of specific students. 2 ' With a minimum skills
test, such as TAAS in Texas (and then TAKS under NCLB), the focus on
basic skills causes proficient students to make less progress learning
more complicated knowledge and skills. 22 An assumption behind educational triage is that teachers will focus on the least rigorous content in
order to show the most gains."D
Counts for Accountability?, in No CHILD LEFT BEHIND AND THE REDUCTION OF THE ACHIEVEMENT
GAP 79 (Sadnovik et. al. eds., 2008); see also Reback, supra, at 5 ("The basic requirements for
states' accountability systems under No Child Left Behind are a close fit with Texas' current
ITAKS] system.").
117. White & Rosenbaum, supra note 94, at 101-02. This study occurred prior to the implementation of NCLB. Id. at 97. White and Rosenbaum note the similarities between the Chicago
model in place at the time of the study and NCLB, which make the findings likely applicable
under NCLB as well. Id.
118. Id. at 105.
119. Neal & Schanzenbach, supra note 59, at 27 ("[T]he implementation of NCLB in
Chicago did not help and may have hurt the children who were likely the farthest behind when
they began school."). Neal and Schanzenbach also found "at best, mixed evidence of gains" of
the top performing students. Id. at 6.
120. Id. at 11; see also Rothstein, supra note 22, at 24 ("NCLB offers no incentive for teachers to focus instruction on students whose ability level is already above the threshold, nor is there
great incentive to focus instruction on students whose ability level is far below that point.").
121. Reback, supra note 116, at 3 1-32.
122. Id. at 33.
123. Matthew G. Springer, Accountability Incentives: Do Failing Schools Practice
Educational
Triage?
23
(2007),
http://media.hoover.org/documents/ednext2008 lSpringer-unabridged.pdf (last visited Nov. 22, 2008).
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Educational triage exists in other forms as well. For example, a study
found that schools in Houston Independent School District used exemptions allowed under NCLB strategically, so that the schools benefited
from the mobility exemptions. 2 4 Additionally, students who have little
chance of passing the test may be passed over as well. Because the
chances these students will pass the test are slim, schools may optimize
costs by ignoring these students to focus on the students on the threshold of proficiency.' 25 The more the standard is raised, the more students
will fall into this failing group. 26 With such a premium on passing the
test, these students may come to be viewed as "threat[s]"' 27 or "liabilit
[ies]' 28 to the school.
The findings of educational triage are not widespread, nor is it a universally accepted phenomenon. Matthew G. Springer, in Accountability
Incentives: Do Failing Schools PracticeEducational Triage?, contests
the existence of educational triage, based on his findings in one small,
rural, predominantly white school in a western state.' 29 Because of differences in demographics of the school Springer studied and the school
Booher-Jennings studied are substantial, Springer's findings are insufficient to rule out the existence of educational triage. White and
30
Rosenbaum studied an inner-city, high poverty school in Chicago;
again, the differences between this school and the school Springer studied are stark. The study of a single school is not generalizable, however
the findings of Booher-Jennings and White and Rosenbaum are sufficient to counter Springer's argument that educational triage does not
exist. Moreover, White and Rosenbaum note that their findings of educational triage "are not likely to apply to affluent schools."'' Affluent
schools have fewer students at risk of failure, and therefore do not suffer the same effects in response to the high stakes testing of NCLB.'
124. See Booher-Jennings & Beveridge, supra note 116, at 82-84. Texas determined a cutoff date in October such that students who moved into a district after the October cut-off date
were not included in the school's scores. Id.
125. Neal & Schanzenbach, supra note 59, at 4-5. Under the same rationale, schools may
have incentives to ignore gifted students as well. Id.
126. Id. at 9-10. White and Rosenbaum found that resources were diverted away from the
most struggling students. White & Rosenbaum, supra note 94, at 102-04.
127. White & Rosenbaum, supra note 94, at 103.
128. Jennifer Booher-Jennings, Rationing Education,supra note 102, at 759.
129. Springer, supra note 123.
130. See White & Rosenbaum, supra note 94.
131. Id. at 111.
132. See id.

October 2010]

Disincentives to Focus Instruction on Students

489

Although educational triage may not have existed in the studied
school by Springer, there is inadequate support to suggest that it does not
exist at all. Further, Springer contends that a zero sum view of resource
constraints may be debatable.'33 If resource constraints were not a matter
of zero sum, there would be no issue of educational triage. Schools could
hire more teachers and provide additional instructional time as needed
for all students. In the low performing, struggling schools that this Note
focuses on, the time and money constraints are palpable.
B. This Emphasis on the Students at the Threshold of Passing
Brings the Top Down
The misalignment of incentives created by NCLB harms students who
are not in the target zone for instruction."3 The teacher becomes focused
on the performance of the class and the school as a whole, instead of the
individual needs and abilities of the students.'35 This leads to the competing goals of improving performance for all students and fairly measuring
the performance of schools.'36 This misalignment leads to a reconstruction of teachers' professional identities and the instructional environment,
such that educational triage becomes a privately asserted goal."'
Educational triage becomes even more troubling when we consider
education as a positional good. Education is a private good in that stu133. Springer, supra note 123, at 10-11.
134. Although this Note addresses on level students in particular, much of the analysis is
likely applicable to other groups of students as well, such as special education students, students
with limited English proficiency, students performing a grade level or more below the testing
expectations, see supra notes 116, 119-20, 126-28 and accompanying text, as well as gifted children. Yates, supra note 3, at 410 (For example, gifted programs are often among the first to be
eliminated because of funding or resource problems.).
135. See Nicholas L. Townsend, Framinga Ceiling as a Floor:The ChangingDefinition of
Learning Disabilities and the Conflicting Trends in Legislation Affecting Learning Disabled
Students, 40 CREIGHTON L. REv. 229,262 (2007).
136. See Booher-Jennings, Rationing Education, supra note 102, at 759. Booher-Jennings
notes the "slippage" between evaluating the needs of the individual students and deciding who to
target to maximize school success. Id. at 758.
137. See Booher-Jennings, Below the Bubble, supra note 112, at 251-58. Booher-Jennings
describes how preparation and success on TAKS (the NCLB assessment in Texas) becomes the
mark of good teaching. Id. at 252. Booher-Jennings argues that the lack of collective responsibility and the competition and isolation between teachers breaks down collegial relationships and
shifts the focus to test results. Id. at 251-58; see also White & Rosenbaum, supra note 94, at 98
(arguing that a high stakes accountability structure fosters "new ways of labeling, treating, and
responding to" students, teacher activities, and teachers themselves). This is not to fault the teachers who make these decisions; NCLB structures the system such that teachers are forced to make
these decisions.
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dents gain psychic, economic, and state benefits throughout their lives.'38
Yet, there is a strongly positional good aspect to education in that one's
position or relative standing in the distribution of education is important.3 9 Education functions as a positional good in several respects,
namely in competition for college and competition for well paying
jobs. 4° Koski and Reich refer to these, respectively as the "admissions
benefit of education" and the "earnings benefit of education."''M The
admissions benefit (college competition) reinforces the earnings benefit
(job potential), and both relate to long term outcomes of "greater job satisfaction, more civic engagement, better health and access to health care,
and general well-being.' ' 42 Accordingly, one's increase in possession of
education necessarily decreases the value of another's education. 43
As a matter of public policy, Koski and Reich argue, it is problematic
if our policies make some students educationally worse off or if we
adopt policies that either exacerbate or fail to alleviate educational
inequalities."4 Koski and Reich argue broadly, looking from school to
school and district to district. This Note agrees, but contends that
because of disparities in qualities of schools, we also need to look at the
opportunities of individual students across schools. For example, a student performing at an average level for one school might not be performing at an average level at another school ."
Considering education as a positional good, and the misalignment of
incentives that NCLB creates, this Note argues that the adequacy focus
of NCLB is inappropriate. NCLB is adequacy based, in that once students meet a designated passing mark, disparities above the passing line
are not considered problematic. NCLB, in keeping with the adequacy
framework, seeks to bring the bottom up to a minimum acceptable level,
and this focus on the minimum is problematic. NCLB assumes a one
138. Koski & Reich, supra note 57, at 549.
139. Id. "Positional goods are competitive goods and valued as a means to achieving some
other end or goal." Id. at 596. Positional goods include both scarce goods, such as first edition
stamps or beach houses, and competitive goods, such as status, representation, or legal representation in an adversarial system. Id. at 597.
140. Id. Koski and Reich also cite a third aspect in which education functions as a positional good: social reputation and status. Id. at 598. As social reputation and status apply primarily in
the context of private school admission, id., they are beyond the scope of this Note.
141. Id. at 597.
142. Id. at 597-98.
143. Id. at 549.
144. See id.
145. See, e.g., White & Rosenbaum, supra note 94, at 105.
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size fits all approach, in the assumption that the minimum proficiency is
acceptable."4 Adequacy does not address the achievement gap between
rich and poor because it is "insensitive" to the concept of positional
advantage. 47 NCLB, with adequacy as its backbone, is the same. When
NCLB is viewed through the lens of educational adequacy, the focus on
the minimum, and the disservices that come as a result, is exposed.
V. FOCUSING ON THE MINIMUM IS A POOR PUBLIC
POLICY DECISION AND CREATES POOR INCENTIVES
FOR EDUCATION.

A. NCLB as a Ceiling Instead of a Floor in Low Performing
Schools
Our educational policies should be designed to bring the bottom up.'
At issue is whether we want to bring the top down. If we accept that education is a positional good, then as Koski and Reich argue, we should
adopt policies that alleviate educational inequities across schools. Some
suggest that present inequalities are not necessarily indicative of poor
educational policy. NCLB could "be a rising tide that lifts all boats (and
lifting some more than others), or it may be a falling tide sinking all boats
(and sinking some less than others.)' 49 This Note contends that we have
reason to believe it is the latter. The uniform objective minimum standard
of NCLB is non-responsive to the potential of individual students.
Admittedly, findings of educational triage are not (yet) widespread.
But findings of educational triage exist. The incentives line up in such a
way, particularly in low performing schools,"S that educational triage
ought to be expected.

146. See Koski & Reich, supra note 57, at 571-72. NCLB makes assumptions about the
homogeneity of learning, assuming a false sense of equality that ignores actual differences. See
Townsend, supra note 135, at 249. Townsend specifically discusses the problems of NCLB with
respect to special education students, however, the analysis is applicable to other students as well
because of the focus on achieving a minimum proficiency level.
147. Koski & Reich, supra note 57, at 605.
148. As previously, it is debatable whether NCLB does this. See supra Part II.B.
149. Reback, supra note 116, at 34.
150. See supra Part IV. Educational triage is a natural response to a system that rewards and
punishes only those changes which alter the number of proficient students. Neal &
Schanzenbach, supra note 59, at 10.
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Comments from teachers indicate the goal is passing the test and
improvements that do not bring a student to the passing mark are insufficient. For instance, Booher-Jennings interviewed a teacher, Noreen,
who stated, "I guess there's supposed to be remediation for anything
below 55 [percent], but you have to figure out who to focus on in class,
and I definitely focus more attention on the bubble kids. If you look at
her score ... she's got a 25%. What's the point in trying to get her to
grade level?"' 5 ' Faulting teachers for this behavior is inappropriate. It
comes down to a choice teachers are forced to make. With limited time
and resources, teachers must choose: Either allow those students on the
cusp of proficiency to fail the test, which carries both individual consequences for the student (possible retention as well as a marker in the permanent school record) as well as consequences for the school (failure to
meet AYP), or focus instruction on those students and leave proficient
students to independent activities they can complete without teacher
instruction. That is not a fair choice for teachers or students, and the
teachers cannot be faulted for choosing the path of educational triage.'52
As a result or unintended consequence of NCLB, a ceiling is placed
on the potential of students performing at testing expectations. "No ...
child has a right to anything more than learning to achieve these basic[]
[skills] at an average level." 53

151. Booher-Jennings, Below the Bubble, supra note 112, at 242; see also id. at 253 ("If you
have a kid who is getting a 22 [percent], even if they improve to a 40, they won't be close-but if
you have a kid with a 60, well, they're in shooting range."). Booher-Jennings noted the teachers
had strong commitments working with children from poverty, id. at 242, however, the structure
is such that they must neglect some students to work with others.
152. See Booher-Jennings, Rationing Education,supra note 102, at 761 ("[The teacher] can
choose to teach all of her students ...
or she can participate in educational triage. If she refuses
to focus her time and attention on those students most likely to raise the school's scores, she risks
not only the school's survival but her professional reputation as a good teacher and, potentially,
her job.").
153. Townsend, supra note 135, at 264. Looking forward, there are already instances of students bringing suit for being passed through school despite learning at an insufficient level. See,
e.g., Sturm v. Bd.of Educ., No. Civ.A.2:06-0342, slip op. at 1 (S.D. W. Va. June 1, 2006) (graduate of Kanawha County high school sued the school board for allowing him to graduate despite
being illiterate); Feranda Santos, A Class Action - IlliterateStudent Sues, Gets City to Payfor
Tutor, N.Y. DAILY NEws, Sept. 26, 2003, at 3. (a ninth-grade student won a $15,000 settlement
for her school district for continually promoting her, despite identifying her as illiterate). One
may wonder whether a future level of educational litigation could involve student plaintiffs who
performed on level but who were allowed to languish while teachers focused on those students
at the threshold of proficiency.
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B. Suggested Solutions to Bring Everyone Up
Commentators have suggested a multitude of ways to deal with the
problems posed by the high stakes testing of NCLB. Suggestions include
rewarding schools for all improvements in achievement, rather than
rewarding (or punishing) solely for attaining a fixed proficiency threshold."M Others suggest using an individualized growth model, instead of
a static model, whereby a school is measured against its own year to year
improvement,'55 or that all scores should be reported, even if not all the
scores are used to determine accountability ratings.'56 Proposed solutions
also include replacing high stakes punishments with low stakes rewards,
and applying the rewards to both students and teachers.157 Additional recommendations include viewing shortcomings as shared problems and
devising systematic strategies to address those problems," fostering
teacher collaboration,' 9 investing in improving organizational capacity,
and running pilot studies before engaging in a substantially new
61
program.1
For this Note's purposes of addressing the needs of on level students,
an equity approach is the most appropriate. An equity approach would
benefit all students because of the comparative focus. An equity-oriented approach allows comparisons between poor and affluent schools. 62
Instead of focusing on the bare minimum, an equity approach allows
gaps to be addressed, such that the positional aspects of education can
be considered."6 Such an approach has the potential to help alleviate the
cycle in which the same schools are perpetually underperforming and
weakening the positional opportunities of the students attending it. At
the very least, our public policy decisions should not exacerbate the
1 60

154. Neal & Schanzenbach, supra note 59, at 41.
155. R. MURRAY THOMAS, HIGH STAKES TESTING 272 (2005).
156. Booher-Jennings & Beveridge, supra note 116, at 91. Booher-Jennings and Beveridge
note that state governments may be resistant because reporting all scores would reveal that NCLB
overlooks certain students, such as those groups for which the numbers are too low to constitute
a subgroup requiring reporting, students who move to the district after the designated cut-off date
(the mobility exemption), and those special education students who receive exemptions or
accommodations from the test. Id. at 91-92.
157. White & Rosenbaum, supra note 94, at 112.
158. Id.
159. Ratner, supra note 21, at 40.
160. White & Rosenbaum, supra note 94, at 112-13.
161. THOMAS, supra note 155, at 283-84.
162. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
163. See discussion supra Part IV.
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already existing inequalities. 64 For this purpose, two methods may be
particularly appropriate: a value added approach or a cost out approach.
In a value added approach, the focus is on achievement gains over
time for the same individual or groups of students. 5 The value added
approach provides a more accurate picture of school quality, and does
not generate the same "perverse incentives" present under NCLB.'6 A
value added approach would allow the performance of on level students
to be presented and addressed, a critical initial step in demanding
improvement in these students from year to year.'67
Under a cost out approach, courts can and do use equity to target
resources to underprivileged children."6 Two common interpretations of
the cost out approach are the "professional-judgment" approach and the
"successful schools approach."'69 Under the former, school professionals
give their best professional judgment about the resources needed to meet
particular goals. 7 ° Under the latter, high performing schools serve as a
model and the benchmark used to determine the level of resources necessary for success.'7' A potential drawback to the cost out approach is
that disagreement exists as to what extent resources influence student
achievement.'72
164. See Koski & Reich, supra note 57, at 550.
165. See Neal & Schanzenbach, supra note 59, at 35-40; Ryan, Perverse Incentives, supra
note 20, at 979.
166. Ryan, PerverseIncentives, supra note 20, at 980. The test scores from one year will not
show what value a school has added to students' knowledge and abilities. Id. at 979-80. Data
from multiple years is required. Id. at 980-81. Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Minnesota, and
Vermont have a "performance index" system for determining AYP. Id. at 986. A performance
index approach such as the system in place in these states "gives schools full credit for students
who hit the proficiency benchmark and partial credit for students who have moved closer to the
mark." Id. Ryan proposes other states implement such a system. Id.
167. There are practical complications of value added, including that testing methods may
not measure gains accurately, some gains may be a result of factors aside from the school or
teacher, and that there is not an appropriate basis for comparing gains of students across different ability levels. Dale Ballou, Sizing Up Test Scores, EDUC. NExT 12 (Summer 2002). Dale
Ballou argues that a value added approach can be good for diagnostic assessment but is too uncertain for an accountability assessment. Id. at 13.
168. Cost out is actually considered a remedy of the adequacy framework. See note 65. Even
within the adequacy framework, some of the proposed remedies can be viewed through a lens of
equity.
169. Koski & Reich, supra note 57, at 567.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 567-68.
172. See Ryan & Saunders, supra note 64, at 475. Diana Pullin argues that how increased
funding is used is as important as the presence of the actual new funds themselves. Diana Pullin,
Ensuring an Adequate Education:Opportunity to Learn, Law, and Social Science, 27 B.C. THRD
WORLD LJ. 83, 114 (2007); see also Eric A. Hanushek, The Alchemy of "Costing Out" an
Adequate Education, in SCHOOL MoNEY TRIALS 77, 89 (Martin R. West & Paul E. Peterson eds.,
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Important to either the value added or the cost out approach is the
importance of collecting information from a broader range of subjects
and cut-off points, which will enable teachers to see the benefits of
3
working with students at every level in multiple areas.Y
A fundamental criticism leveled at either the value added or the cost
out approach, or in fact, virtually any of the proposed solutions to NCLB
previously discussed, is that legislative and judicial mandates that do not
address other social and institutional factors will not provide change in
the opportunities for meaningful learning at the classroom level. 74 First,
it has not been fully established that equalizing resources will overcome
disparities that students bring from home. 75 Second, even apart from
funding, schools with many low-income students may continue to have
low achievement.'76 Christopher E. Adams, in Is Economic Integration
the Fourth Wave in School FinanceLitigation?, notes the importance of
the socioeconomic status of one's classmates related to one's individual
success." Additionally, students from low income backgrounds "tend to
have fewer positive role models, lower expectations for academic
achievement, and they are less likely to believe that achievement will
have positive consequences."'78
2007) (noting no causal relationship has been determined between spending and student performance); Heise, Litigated Learning, supranote 29, at 1451 ("Courts that accept ... [the assumption
that student achievement is a function of per pupil spending] presume causal simplicity and clarity where reality is anything but simple and clear."). But see Michael A. Rebell, Poverty,
"Meaningful" EducationalOpportunity, and the Necessary Role of the Courts, 85 N.C. L. RE,.
1467, 1476 (2007) (arguing that "money matters" in closing the achievement gap). Ryan does not
address this criticism, instead accepting the fundamental premise of school finance litigation,
which is that more funds assist struggling schools. See Ryan, Standards, supra note 47, at 1226.
Further, Ryan, in advocating the cost out approach, in fact views it as a short term solution. See id.
at 1259-60. This is indicative of some who see NCLB as another fad in educational reform, and
believe it may no longer exist by 2014. See, e.g., Ryan, PerverseIncentives, supra note 20, at 98587 ("The odds are quite good that... NCLBIi is another fad.").
173. See White & Rosenbaum, supra note 94, at 112.
174. See Pullin, supra note 172, at 115.
175. See Enrich, supra note 62, at 150.
176. See Adams, supra note 69, at 1615; Richard D. Kahlenberg, Socioeconomic School
Integration, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1545, 1547-50 (2007).
177. Adams, supra note 69, at 1628-29. Adams argues that peer influence is a substantial
factor and it is common for students from low income socioeconomic backgrounds to "denigrate
academic achievement." Id. at 1629. For this reason, Adams proposes economic integration,
instead of or in addition to adequacy. Id. at 1636-39; see also Kahlenberg, supra note 176, at 1548
("[T]he socioeconomic status of a school is the single most important determinant of a student's
academic success."). This argument weighs against the costing out approach as well, as costing
out does not address issues aside from providing additional funds.
178. Id. at 1628-29; see also Kahlenberg, supra note 176, at 1549 (2007) ("Virtually everything that educators talk about as being desirable in a school-high standards, good teachers,
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Despite criticisms, this Note agrees with Ryan that in order to apply
some of the arguments and ideology of school finance litigation, we
must accept the premise that more funds will assist struggling schools."'
Were this not the case, much of the resistance to equity arguments would
fall away. If people did not believe that at a basic level, funding can
make a significant difference, the fears of "leveling" (discussed below)
would not exist. This Note does not contend that increased funding can
solve all problems struggling schools face; rather, increased funding is a
necessary, but not a sufficient, step toward improving our struggling
schools.
Argument exists advocating the strength of the adequacy conception
and weakness of the equity conception. Enrich poses four main arguments to this end. Enrich argues first that adequacy is preferable because
it is explicit, it appeals to normative values, and adequacy is less threatening than equity or equality frameworks. 8 Enrich then argues against
an equity conception because it is too difficult to implement, threatens
other societal values, and will start a slippery slope toward requiring
equity in other areas. 8 ' This Note argues these arguments are flawed and
will address each in turn.
This Note grants Enrich's first argument, that a strength of the adequacy framework is that the state constitution education clause serves as
an explicit textual source as an authority for an adequacy interpretation."8 However, this advantage alone is insufficient to maintain an adequacy framework.
Enrich's second argument in support of the adequacy conception is
that adequacy appeals to the normative values of fairness and opportunity.'" This argument is flawed in that it does not appear to question
whose normative values are considered. It is reasonable to infer that the
normative values of the people in the poorer schools are not addressed.i4
active parents, adequate resources, a safe and orderly environment, and a stable student and
teacher population-are found in middle class schools but not in low-income schools.").
179. See Ryan, Standards,supra note 47, at 1226.
180. Enrich, supra note 62, at 166-69.
181. Id. at 144-45.
182. See id. at 166.
183. Id. at 167.
184. Recall Kozol's interviews of inner-city Camden students. See supra note 99. When
asked what he thought would happen if Camden schools and nearby affluent Cherry Hills schools
were integrated, one student responded, "You'd see progress very fast. Parents of white children,
with their money, they'd come in and say, 'We need this fixed. Our kids deserve it."' KOZOL,
supra note 99, at 154. The students Kozol interviewed in Camden did not view their educational circumstances as representative of their normative values.
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In a similar vein, Enrich's third argument in support of adequacy is that
it is less threatening than equality arguments.'85 Enrich contends that the
leveling aspect of equity is threatening, implying zero-sum, such that
those at the top will be hindered, and brought down to the level of those
at the bottom."a There is the fear that equity may be seen as dispossession. 7 Enrich compares this to adequacy arguments, which "draw upon
deep-seated moral currents that measure a society by how well it treats
its least fortunate citizens.'
Kind-hearted as this may appear, the
patronizing aspect of it toward the people who attend the poorer schools
is inappropriate as a matter of educational policy.
Enrich's arguments against an equity approach are flawed as well.
Enrich argues that equity is too difficult to implement.'89 The value
added and cost out approaches discussed previously, do have their difficulties. 9° However, the cost out approach, in particular, is actually a
solution from the adequacy framework. 9' Further, despite potential difficulties in implementation, there is no reason to think they are insurmountable. A shift toward either of these conceptions would be a step in
the right direction.
Enrich also argues that equity demands too much and threatens other
societal values."9 Specifically, there is a fear of hamstringing wealthier
school districts in terms of resource transfer, losing the ability to provide
the best teachers, and a threatening of post-school advantage. 93 Enrich
also raises the slippery slope argument against using an equity conception in education."9 Each of these fears, this Note contends, are misplaced. Regarding resource transfer,'95 first, the "rough equity"' 96 this
Note suggests provides comparable education between districts, which
185. Enrich, supra note 62, at 168-69.
186. Id. at 168. Interestingly, this conception, in a sense, is the opposite of a central thesis
of this Note, which is that NCLB, because of its focus on adequacy, functions as a ceiling on the
achievement of on level students.
187. KOZOL, supra note 99, at 172-73. This argument also appears in the form of advocating for local control and autonomy. See id. at 173.
188. Enrich, supra note 62, at 168. Adequacy, Enrich maintains, "bring[s] the bottom tiers
up to some threshold of effective basic education." Id. at 169.
189. Id. at 144.
190. See text accompanying notes 174-78.
191. See Koski & Reich, supra note 57, at 565; see also supra note 65.
192. Enrich, supra note 62, at 155.
193. Id. at 157-58.
194. Id. at 162.
195. Enrich refers to resource transfer plans as "Robin Hood schemes." Id. at 157.
196. Ryan used this phrase in his recommendations. Ryan, Standards, supra note 47, at
1252.
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does not necessarily mean equal dollars spent per pupil."9 Second,
Enrich himself admits that such resource transfer may still occur with an
adequacy conception because of real world practicalities in the implementation of either adequacy or equity."9 For this reason, this argument
is insufficient to merit a withdrawal from an equity conception. Enrich's
next arguments against equity are that equity leads to the loss of ability
for parents in the wealthier schools to provide the best teachers for their
own children, and threatens the post-school advantage of these children.' 99 Problems with teacher preparation and qualification is beyond
the scope of this Note. Both of these arguments about threatening the
advantages available to students in wealthier schools show how parents
and communities have incentives to protect the positional advantages of
their children. This itself is not a flaw. We should expect that parents
want to provide the best resources possible for their children. The problem lies with the positional disadvantage of children in low performing
schools. A system such as NCLB that permits groups of children to
receive a substantially inferior education sets them at a disadvantage
compared to their peers in more affluent communities. Enrich's arguments seek to perpetuate the achievement gap and the discrepancies
between low performing and more affluent schools.
We need to make a fundamental decision about the importance of educating children, and it should be that all children deserve an equal opportunity for education. The notion promulgated by Enrich that the adequacy ideology is "less threatening" 2 ° is patronizing. In effect, it says, let's
educate the poor children, just not as well as we educate our own. In fact,
Enrich admits as much, questioning whether the aim of adequacy is too
low because of the focus on the minimum. "[W]e in all likelihood relegate vast groups of children to mediocre educational opportunities (or
worse), and we ensure that they will face significant competitive disadvantages relative to their peers from privileged communities."201
Finally, Enrich's slippery slope argument, that requiring equity in education may lead to requiring equity in other realms ,2° is unsubstantiated.
197. See id. at 1251.
198. Enrich, supranote 62, at 169 ("In the real world of state budgets, the massive resources
needed to bring undeffunded schools up to a reasonable foundation level must come from somewhere ....Adequacy arguments, like equality arguments, lead to a redistribution of resources
from richer to poorer.").
199. Id. at 157-58.
200. Id. at 168.
201.Id. at 181.
202. Id. at 161.
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Enrich himself answers this, noting that state constitutions give education a special priority. 3 Thus, the slippery slope argument becomes a
non-issue.
This Note agrees that an equity approach may be difficult and that in
some respects, there is more explicit textual authority for an adequacy
conception. Neither of these outweighs the arguments against adequacy
nor the arguments in support of equity. The positional discrepancies that
are allowed to continue under an adequacy regime perpetuate the
achievement gap between low and high performing schools such that the
same schools succeed and the same schools fail. This is an unacceptable
result. Value added and cost out approaches, although by no means perfect, are relatively modest approaches that can be taken to alleviate some
of the discrepancy.
VI. CONCLUSION: A RETURN TO EQUITY

A. Being Realistic with Equity
A conception of "rough equity" may suffice to address some of the
problems of NCLB.2 °4 Ryan proposes the successful-schools cost out
approach previously discussed as a practical solution. 5 This approach
requires neither equal funding per student nor does it prevent providing
more resources to students who need more.2c 6
Ideas of vertical equity, which at the extreme involves the redistribution of resources in accordance with need to give students an equal
opportunity to achieve the same outcome, may play a role in achieving
rough equity, in a less controversial manner."° Under a conception of
vertical equity, students with greater needs should be given greater
203. Id. at 161-62 ("Equal protection theory ... affords a simple method for confining the
most intrusive demands of equal treatment to such constitutionally privilege precincts [as education].").
204. See Ryan, Standards,supra note 47, at 1250-51.
205. Id. at 1250-52. After identifying the model schools or districts, we should examine
whether the state is providing comparable resources to the school in question. Id.
206. Id. at 1251. In fact, the state necessarily will need to provide more funds for the needier students. Koski & Reich, supra note 57, at 614. Kozol argues that such an approach, which
"look[s] for something resembling equity that never reaches it" will necessarily fail because a
conception of rough equity will always favor the privileged group. KOZOL, supra note 99, at 175.
207. See Ryan & Saunders, supra note 64, at 468-72.
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resources.2"8 Vertical equity shifts the focus from school district to individual student,2°9 in keeping with a general theme of this Note.
Vertical equity is potentially controversial, however, there are several
examples of how it has been implemented. In Hoke County Board of
Education v. State, the court held that at-risk status cut across districts,
and the trial court mandated pre-kindergarten for all at-risk students "to
afford [them] an equal opportunity to obtain a sound basic education."2
This case demonstrates how the language of adequacy ("sound basic
education") and equity ("an equal opportunity") may meld."' On appeal,
despite agreeing that the state funding method was unconstitutional, the
North Carolina Supreme Court struck down the order mandating prekindergarten finding insufficient grounds to support the order."2
In Abbott v. Burke, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that states
must spend more money on students from poor districts than wealthy
districts in order to comply with the state constitution.213 The court
assured funding of education in poor districts at the same level of
wealthy districts.2 4 The court's rationale was that funding could not
depend on the ability of the local school district to tax .15
Funding had to
be guaranteed and mandated by the state and had to consider the special
needs of poor urban districts in order to compensate for their extreme
disadvantage .216

These cases are examples of ways equity can be implemented to
address the needs of all students. Utilizing some of the rationale from
208. See Tico A. Almeida, Refocusing School Finance Litigation on At-Risk Children:
Leandro v. State of North Carolina, 22 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 525,553 (2004).
209. Id. at 555. As a result of the focus on the at-risk students, vertical equity has the potential to make school finance litigation more effective by targeting the neediest students.
210. Hoke County Bd. of Educ. v. State, No. 95CVS 1158, 2000 WL 1639686, at *8 (N.C.
Sup. Ct. Oct. 12, 2000).
211. Id. The plaintiff in Hoke argued that the state needed "to provide sufficient resources
to enable the child to be on equal footing with other children so that child has an equal opportunity to take advantage of the educational delivery systems available." Id. at *9.This focus on the
relation to others is indicative of the relational quality of the equity framework. By contrast, the
state's response was that it provided an adequate education. Id.
212. Hoke County Bd.of Educ. v. State, 599 S.E.2d 365 (N.C. 2004).
213. Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359 (NJ. 1990). Ryan noted that the New Jersey legislature
sought to circumvent the ruling by setting education standard and determining the cost of meeting those standards, which was much less than the court had ordered. Ryan, Standards,supra note
47, at 1241. Ryan argues this is an indication that setting minimum proficiency as the standard
would lead to less resources allocated to struggling schools. Id.
214. Abbott, 575 A.2d at 384.
215. Id. at 408.
216. Id.
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these cases can help us to advance educational policies serving the needs
of all students.
B. Finding an Approach to Cope with NCLB that Assures the
Needs of on Level Students in Low Performing Schools are
Appropriately Addressed
The analysis in this Note is not necessarily unique to students performing on level. Much of it applies to the students at risk of failure,
who certainly deserve attention. At the same time, we should be cautious
that our plans do not overlook other students. We saw that students who
seem to be on level or average compared to their peers may in fact be
lower when viewed on a broader scale. 17 Without adequate instruction,
these students, as well as other on level students, may be the students
just below the proficiency threshold or even lower the following year.
An educational triage approach is a band-aid type approach for one year,
but at best, it only pushes the problem off.
If we are concerned about the disparities between schools and districts, and we want to revive the sentiment of Brown v. Board of
Education, we need to look beyond just the students at risk of failure.
This is why we need a framework that looks deeper than the type of the
school or even the performance of a subgroup of students. We need to
look beyond whether a student hit an arbitrarily set mark on a standardized test. Viewing student performance through the lens of equity would
enable us to do so218 and help ensure that schools do not further perpetuate discrepancies with which students arrive to school.

217. White & Rosenbaum, supra note 94, at 105.
218. "[These] children ... will be at-risk before they ever enter a school building and it is
not those children's fault." Hoke County Bd. of Educ. v. State, No. 95CVS1158, 2000 WL
1639686, at *93 (N.C. Sup. Ct. Oct. 12, 2000).

